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Abstract 
The determinants of job satisfaction are estimated from difference 
equations using four waves of the British Household Pane 工 Study. We find 
that those moving into union jobs report a drop in overall job 
satisfaction and those moving into the public sector an increase. This 
finding 多 reduces the likelihood that cross-sectional results showing lower 
可令rall job satisfaction for union members and higher satisfaction for 
p... 弓 ector workers reflect individual-specific effects (endogeneity). 
However , we find that cross-sectional results on satisfaction with the 
wo玄king environment and with pay do , indeed , reflect individual-specific 
effects. Our difference equations indicate that while union workers 
complain more about these aspects , they would complain more in either 
sector. Further , our results suggest public sector workers are by nature 
more satisfied with their pay. 
1. Introduction 
Due partially to the advent of the Bri tish Household Panel Study 
(BHPS) , interest has been rekindled in the economics of job satisfaction 
in Britain . 工 t has long been contended that measures of job satisfaction 
1 
can provide insights in the workings of the labor market~ ， and a variety 
of recent papers present interesting findings . Job satisfaction depends 
on comparison income (Clark and Oswald , 199 6) . Job satisfaction is 
highest among the youngest and oldest workers (Clark , Oswald and Warr , 
1996). Job satisfaction is higher for women (Clark 1995 ) , lower for union 
members (Clark 1996). Related measures of overall satisfaction have been 
growing over the last two decades for youth (B lanchflower and Oswald , 
工 997) and are routinely lower for the unemployed (Clark and Oswald 1994) . 
The finding that union members report less job satisfaction is based 
on Freeman and Medoff's (1984) exit-voice hypothesis which has given rise 
a large union literature on both sides of the Atlantic (see Booth 1995). 
An implication from that hypothesis is that unions create a "climate of 
complaint" as a mechanism to change the work environment in ways favorable 
to the workers. Yet , the contention that unionizat ion , or union j obs , 
generate increased dissatisfaction runs squarely into the issue of 
endogenei ty . That is , the workers observ ed in the union sector may be 
"inherently" less satisfied. As Clark 工 996 ; 202) argues "if unions 
address issues of worke r dissatisfaction , the more dissatisfied will be 
the most attracted to union membership." Thi s debate has been joined by 
Bender and Sloa ne (1996 ) who find s trong e vidence of endogene i t y and argue 
that once corrected f or there is little s ugges tion that unionization is 
causally associated with less job satisfaction. 工 n sho r t , unions simply 
attract worke rs who would be less sa t isfied in eithe玄 sector.
工
This paper rejoins the issue using the advantages of the longitudinal 
data in the BHPS. We present cross - sectional estimates which replicate 
the result that union members are less satisfied overall with their jobs. 
We then estimate a difference equation for job changers which demonstrates 
that those workers who change to unionized status report a decrease in job 
satisfaction and those who chan弓e to nonunionized status report an 
increase in job satisfaction. The difference equation holds the 
individual-specific component of job satisfaction constant and represents 
an innovation in this literature. The results suggest individual-specific 
effects are unlikely to be generating the cross-sectional results. 
We also examine p立blic sector employment to improve understanding of 
the contrast between cross-section and difference equation results. Past 
evidence suggests that there may be queues for public sector jobs even 
when the earn工ngs differentials are modest (Heywood and Mohanty 工 995) .工t
is often argued that such cr斗eues ref工ect the grea t.er job satisfaction 
associated with better working conditions of public sector employment. 
Again , greater public sector job satisfaction may result largely from 
endogeneity. Workers who naturally find more satisfaction in their work 
may be attracted to the public sector. Our resul ts for overall j ob 
satisfaction present a similar pattern for union and for public sector 
workers , indicating that endogeneity does not generate the cross-section 
results. Nevertheless , when we examine different facets of job 
satisfaction , considering satisfaction simply with the work itself , or 
with pay , instructive differences emerge. 
工n what follows , section two sets the stage b y reviewing past studies 
and isolating the value-added from using the difference equations. 
Section three describes the data source and the extracted sample. Section 
four presents the cross-sectional results and uses them to present 
2 
alternative estimates of the cornpensating difEerentials for union and 
government ernployment. Section fi ve presents the difference equation 
results and section six expands the difference equations by examining 
several specific facets of job satisfaction. Section seven presents a 
short conclusion. 
工工. Past Research and the Value of Difference Equations 
The Dissatisfied Union Mernber 
At least three rnajor explanations exist for the often reported 
finding that union rnernbers have lower job satisfaction. The rnost popular 
argument is that lower satisfaction is a natural result of the voice role 
f ' 
played by unions. Trade unions succeed in providing workers with better 
sation and working conditions by providing a collective voice 
alternative to quitting their jobs (Freernan and Medoff 1984). The union 
thus helps rnobilize or encourage discontent as a necessary prerequisite 
for successfully rnaking dernands of the firrn. Borjas (1979) suggests the 
discontent is not "genuine" as it does not lead to quits but it is a 
"device" designed so that the workforce can be heard. Bender and Sloane 
(1996) argue that this is not compelling as ernployees recognize that 
project interviewers will not 玄eveal answers to the firrn and thus have no 
incentive to exaggerate dissatisfaction. Freernan 工 980) does seem to 
suggest the discontent is genuine c工airning the voice function of unions 
rnay encourage workers to stay in jobs they do not like and try to irnprove 
their working conditions from within. 
工 ndependent of whether the cornplaints are genuine , the exi t -voice 
hypothesis does not stand without challenge. The second major explanation 
for lower job satisEaction among union members takes the e v idence at face 
va工ue and say s that union j obs are inh erent ly less pleasant. 工ndeed ，
3 
Duncan and Stafford (1980) argue that unions are likely to arise in 
exactly those situations in which shared adverse working conditions give 
riseto workplace public goods. 工 n their view attempting to solve the 
workplace public goods problem is an essential u口ion function. Examining 
three U. S. bargaining uni ts containing both union and nonunion workers I 
Gordon and DeNisi (1 虫 95) found no difference in job satisfaction or quit 
rates between the union and nonunion members wi thin the uni t . Thus I 
either unions provide "voice" to nonunion members in a bargaining - unît , 
which seems unlike工y ， or shared job conditions generate similar levels of 
satisfaction for otherwise equal union and nönunion members. 
Ultimately , it may be difficult to determine if dissatisfaction is 
~ ! 
. 
司enerated by the process of unionization (exit-voice) or by the nature of 
;obs. Even if working conditions have not been sufficiently 
standardized , the fact that union workers are less satisfied even 
conditional on their wage argues that whatever wage premium exists is not 
sufficient to compensate for the working conditions. This , however , still 
leaves unanswered the question of why union members do not quit which may 
leave some room for "voice" explanations. 2 
The third major exp工anation contends that union members are observed 
expressing dissatisfaction because naturally dissatisfied workers are more 
likely to join a union. In this view there is an individual-specific 
element of job satisfaction which has a distribution across potential 
workers. Unions as mechanisms of complaint attract workers from the lower 
end of the job satisfaction distribution , those with the most complaints. 
Such endogeneity , or sorting , amounts to a correlation between the error 
term and the union variable in the estimation of satisfaction. The result 
is that despite a negative partial correlation between unions and job 
satisfaction neither the "culture of complaint" nor the nature of union 
4 
jobs results in lower satisfaction. The tendency of workers from the 
lower end of the job satisfaction distribution to be sorted into the union 
sector has been labelled "reverse causa t. ion" by Bender and Sloane (1996). 
A variety of authors tackle the sorting problem but ào so in the 
context of cross-sectional estimates. The standard approach has been to 
instrument the union rnembership variable . 工 n a first stage , a union 
mem.bership model is estimated and the predicted membership variable is 
then used in the second stage job satisfaction equation. Using U.S. data , 
Borjas (1979) and Kochan and Helfman (工 981) find that the predicted union 
mernbership variable continues to be a significant and negative partial 
correlate of satisfaction. They conclude that endogeneity is not a 
~ 
-
crucial issue. However , Miller (工 990) uses Australian data and finds that 
the predicted union membership variable becomes insignificant. Bender and 
Sloane use British data from the Social Change and Economic Life 
工nitiative survey (SCEL工) and estimate equations for four measures of job 
satisfaction for females , manual males and nonmanual males. They also 
find that the inclusion of the p玄edicted union membership variable often 
results in an insignificant coefficient despite the fact that the actual 
membership variable typically emerges with a significant negative 
coefficient. This they take as evidence of endogeneity or reverse 
causality. 
Bender and Sloane also inc 工ude a variable which identifies workers' 
views of the quali ty of industrial :t'elations at their workplace. Once the 
satisfaction equations are estimated with the industrial re工ations quality 
variable , the importance of the predicted union membership fades even 
further. An implication of this finding is that union membership , low job 
satisfaction and a poor quality of industrial relations are linked . Yet , 
wi thout being able to properly control for indi vidua工 -specific effects , 
5 
-the exact nature of that linkage 玄emains unclear. 
Ultimately , observed union membership depends both on a worker 
searching for a union job and being offered a union job (Abowd and Farber 
1983). Thus , reduced form probability estimates of the sort used in the 
literature cannot model which characteristics cause a t-Jorker to "choose" a 
unioni zed j ob. They might more legi tima tely be desc工 ibed as models of 
which character土 stics tend to be associated with a union job. Thus , the 
series of cross-sectional corrections for endogeneity would seem to 
confuse the second explanation , that union jobs are inherently worse , and 
the third explanation , that union members are sorted from the lower end of 
the job satisfaction distribution. 
. 
，守T 
~ . 
工ndeed ， Borjas (1979) in his 
correction for endogeneity identified "reverse causation" as the tendency 
for certain "jobs" to be unionized. The inability to separate 
characteristics associated with union jobs from those associated with 
workers searching for union jobs makes it difficult to determine whether 
including estimated probabilities of unionization corrects for the 
tendency of union jobs to be associated with lower satisfaction or of 
3 
union workers t. o be associated wi th lower satisfaction . - Thus , the玄e
seems to be a call for an alternative method of holding individual worker 
effects constant . 
主垃豆 Satisfied Public Sector Worker 
To demonstrate the importance of our adopted econometric technique we 
also present resu工 ts for the job satisfaction of public sector workers. 
Public sector workers provide a contrast with union workers in that public 
sector workers are likely to be more satisfied as they appea主 to have 
better working conditions. Analysis of public sector workers is more 
straightforward in that there is no equivalent to the exit-voice theory 
that would suggest satisfaction in the public sector sho uld not reflect 
6 
comparisons of actual working condi tions. Hence , the cross -sectional 
compar l. sons l. n earn l. ngs ，中lits and other job attributes which show a 
modest advantage for the public sector can be taken at their face value. 4 
At the same time , even if the expectation that public sector workers 
are more sat 斗 sfied is confirmed 工n the cross-section，工t may not translate 
to similar findings in the difference equations. Just as in the case of 
unionization there may be reverse causality in which more easily satisfied 
workers are sorted (for whatever reason) into the public sector. All that 
is required is that public sector workers differ systematically from 
private sector workers (for instance , degree of r工 sk aversion or 
proclivities toward certain occupations) and that those differences be 
‘r " g 
司 ssociated with the distribution of the individual-specific job 
ction element. Thus , if public secto玄 workers are sorted from the 
upper portion of the job satisfaction distribution , the difference 
equation holds constant these individual-specific elements and allows a 
clearer examination of the actual role of public sector employment. 
工n fact , as we will show , when the different facets of job 
satisfaction are analyzed important contrasts emerge in the role of 
individual worker effects as between union workers and public sector 
workers. Cross-sectional evidence suggests union workers are less 
satisfied with "the work itself" while public sector works are more 
satisfied with the work itself. Our difference equation methodology 
reveals , however , that the superiority of "the work itself" in the pub工 ic
sector is real , while the unpleasantness of the work itself in the union 
sector is not . Thus , when we observe public sector workers moving to the 
private sector they report lower satisfaction with the work itselfi but 
when we observe union workers moving to nonunion job they report no change 
in satisfacti on . 工 n this case , public sector workers provide an example 
7 
in which the difference equation result matches the cross-section but that 
for union workers does not. Focusing the difference equation methodology 
on both union workers and public sector workers , and exam土ning several 
different facets of job satisfaction , therefore provides a better 
understanding of workers' attitudes toward their jobs. 
立已且9 th旦 Difference' Eouations 
Ultimately cross-section estimates which attempt to account for 
endogeneity by using instrumental variables are only as good as the 
instrument. Much of the variation in results on the presence of reverse 
causationmay flow from differences in the quality of instruments. We use 
f 
-
'"'\ alternative rnethod which more nearly holds constant the individual 
b L d c c。mponentsof3ob sati sfaction.5 
Assume that in adjacent periods t and t-1 job satisfaction for each 
worker , i , is a function of a vector of controls , X, unionization U, 
publ ic sector employment , p , and an individual fixed effect Ki : 
S~~ X~~ß + ÕU~~+γP.. + k. it it' it' - it --i -it (1) 
S~ ， X~. ~ß +ÕU. , +γP.. _ + k. it-1 --i t-1 工t-1 . '-it-l . '~i . -it-l 
The term S~ ~ is the reported satisfaction with the job by worker i in 
ìt 
period t. At this stage we treat it as a latent continuous variable. 工n
each period Ki i s f ixed for each individual but acr。S S irldividualS i t may 
be correlated with the variables of interest , U and P. Such a corre工ation
would result from the tendency of less satisfied workers to be sorted into 
the union or more satisfied workers to be sorted into the public sector. 
工 f the equations in (1) were estimated as two separate cross-sections , the 
B 
unobserved k~ would bias the coefficients of interest. This is the issue 
l 
of endogeneity. 
By differencing the equations in (1) the unobserved individual effect 
c an be removed: 
、自'，
1-←』
-R
﹒工
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←』
﹒官
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cu 戶 ( X. . - X. , ~) + Ó (U , , - U " _) +γ(P ，， - p" _)+ (E , -E , 工 t -- i t - 1 . -, - i t 工 t-1 ' . . it 工 t - 1 工 t it-l 
o r (2 ) 
6S~ ß(6X~) + Ó6U~ +γ6P ， +μ -
111 
where μi i S a new error terTn equal tothe di f fererlce in the two error 
terms from (1) and will have all desirable properties if the original 
." 
er玄or terms did. This equation is often called a "job change" equation as 
the vast maj ori t y of controls , and certainly the var i ables of interest , 
tend to rernain constant i f the worker does not change jobs. Equation (2) 
t hen is estirnated on t hose that change jobs and the associated changes in 
the independent and depen dent variables provide e s timates of the partial 
correlations and they do so without the bias of individual fixed effects. 6 
The structure of nearly all satisfaction measu玄es ， including that in 
the BHPS , follows a Like rt scale . 工n t h e BHPS individuals are asked to 
rank their job sati sfaction from 工 to 7 , very dissatisfied to very 
satisfied with t h e measure being anchored at 4 , neither dissatisfied nor 
sat i s f ied.7 When e x amì ning job changers , the change in the satisfaction 
measure ranges from -6 , a change from very satisfied to v ery dissatisfied , 
to +6 , a change fro m v ery dissatisfied to very satisfied. Thi s rneasure is 
obv iously anc h o r e d at zero which indicates no change in satisfaction. 
While havi ng thirtee n categories flir t s with the boundary of a 
cont inuous v ar i able we nev ertheless c ontinue to treat t h e satisfact i on 
change variable as primarily catego玄ical . In t h e differen ce equation we 
9 
observe a gi ven value of ðS i f the latent cont inuous variable , ðS 脅 is
between certain bounds: 
ðS j -6 if ðS* g llS* 
-6 
ðS j 9 if ðS* < ðS* ~ ðS* (3) g-l 9 
ðS j = 6 if ðS* > ðS* g=5 
In this forrnulation 9 E (-5 , 5) , jε(-6 ， +6) and the values of the latent 
variable with subscripts represent the boundary points. This yie工ds the 
thirteen discrete values of ðS which are clearly ordered and may be fit to 
the curnulative norrnal: 
pr。b(ASi=j) F[月 (AXi)+6AUi+γAPi]
such that the (4) 
pr。b(ASi=j ) prob(4siis in the jth range) 
The resulting ordered probit is estirnated by maxirnurn likelihood and 
generates as part of the estimation the cut-points necessary to determine 
the probability that any given observation of the right hand side 
variables is observed in each of the thirteen categories. Those estirnated 
probabilities add to one. Note that we have retained the same symbols for 
the coefficients but they will differ in value frorn those estimated in (2) 
and we wil 工 need to take care in interpreting them. 
While our focus is on union status and public sector ernployment , our 
estimation will allow examination of a wide variety of influences. We 
attempt to follow previous cross-sectional specifications using the BHPS 
to the extent that estimation of a difference equation with so rnany 
categories allows , given that we are using an ordered probit. Thus , 
10 
following the cross-sectional estirnates of Clark 工 996) ， we will examine 
the influence of age , gender , health status , rnarital status , occupation , 
region , earnings , hours of work , size of firm , educational qualifications 
and unionization. To this we add a rneasure of socio-econornic status 8 , the 
provision of emp1oyer-provided pensions and pub1ic sector ernployment. 工n
the difference equation we add durnrnies for each year designed to capture 
tirne-specific effects on the change in satisfaction and a variable which 
identifies whether workers feel they 1eft their previous job for a 
"better" job. This 1ast variable attempts to contro1 for endogenous job 
changers. Those who report leaving for a better job may be more 1ikely to 
report an increase in satisfaction that reflects a better job match. Job 
matching is at the heart of endogenous job changing (Gibbons and Katz 
工 992) . Throughout our examination the issue wil1 be whether or not 
results confirmed in the c玄oss-section remain in the difference equations. 
II 工. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The initia1 data are comp1ete observations from the British Household 
Panel Study (BHPS) for the first four waves , collected from 199 工 to 工 994.
The. sample is limi ted to those workers who are not self -employed since 
measures of earnings often confuse the returns to labor and capitél we 
present results frorn the first and fourth waves as representa巳 4 、
cross-sections. Our diffe玄ence equation is based on those who identify a 
job change between any two adjacent waves. We further lirnit the sample by 
eliminating those who identify their job change as a promotion within the 
same firm. Job changes across firms are more likely to 玄epresent a 
9 
substantial alteration in working conditions.- After this restriction we 
observe exactly 1000 job changes over the four waves of the BHPS. 
Table 工 prese口ts the frequencies for the dependent variables. The 
工工
cross-sections from the first and fourth waves both show that workers tend 
to report satisfaction with their job. 工 n the first wave 77.5 per~ent of 
workers _ report some degree of j ob satis fact ion (5 , 6 , or 7) and the 
average score across all workers is 5.49; corresponding figures for the 
fourth wave are 79. 工. percent and 5.34. The difference in satisfaction 
variable derived from job changers shows that despite small cells in the 
extremes , all possible changes are represented and there is marked 
variation. A total of 45.3 percent of job changers report an increase in 
job satisfaction , 28.2 percent report no change in job satisfaction and 
26.5 report a decline in job satisfaction. The average change in 
satisfaction 
nu -a 
「JhAHE nυ s .工 Note that these changes are generated from 
6 、
唱“
immediately adj acent years and that there are 396 job changers between 
wave 1 and 2 , 291 between wave 2 and 3 and 313 between wave 3 and "4. 
工 t may at first seem unreasonable that slightly more than one quarter 
of all job changers report lower overall job satisfaction after changing 
jobs. After all , it would seem that any process of job choice would 
result in workers moving only if they were made better off by the move. 
Yet , the realization that a sizable minority of job changers report lower 
job satisfaction-is ultimately not surprising. First , workers may change 
11 jobs to increase overall satisfaction even at a 105s of job satisfacti r - -
For examp1e , a worker may take :這in inferio玄 job to move to a prefe:r.L已
location or to accommodate a spouse. Second , not all job changes are by 
choice. Some workers may be dismissed or otherwise 10se a job they liked. 
Fina11y , gi ven transaction costs and uncertainty , there will always be 
some "rnistakes , 11 workers who wished they had not changed jobs and may , in 
the end , be observed changing jobs again. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the independent variables. 
The statistics for the cross-section are frorn the fourth wave of the BHPS 
工 2
but differ only modestly from the first 工 2wave. The values of the 
independent variables for the difference equation represent the post-job 
change values minus the pre-job change values. While more will be made of 
these variables when the difference equation is presented , note that the 
general pattern 工 5 of relatively small means as the changes can be both 
positive and negative. Yet , often the standard deviation is large 
indicating substantial change in the value of the independent variables 
associated with changing jobs. As an illustration , the average measure of 
socio -economic status , "index l1 , is virtually zero but the standard 
deviation i5 more than 13 points on scale from zero to one hundred. 
工V. Th&" Cross-Section Results 
The variables included in the cross-sectional estimates follow 
closely those of Clark (1996). We made some modest changes in order to 
reduce the parameters that would eventually be est工mated in the change 
equation. Thus , we have fewer regional and occupation dummies and have 
included no industry dummies. We experimented with the latter in the 
change equation and never found a statistically significant coefficient. 
We also added some variables of interest to the cross-section . First , we 
13 include the variable indicating employment in the public sector. Second , 
we included the continuous Goldthorpe and Hope (1974) index of 
socio 呵 economic status as computed by the BHPS (工ndex). This was included 
to compensate for any detail lost by reduced occupational and industry 
controls. Third , we include whether or not the respondent' s current 
employer provides a pension as we anticipate that the desire for a pension 
may play an i ...ffiportant role i. n job changing. 
The resu .l ts of the ordered probit estimations for the first and 
fourth waves are presented in Table 3. 工 n each case the dependent 
variable is the 1 - 7 measure of overall satisfaction with the j o b. Note 
工 3
that both attrition and addition make the sample in wave 4 different from 
14 
that in wave 1. While the estimates leave much of the "variation" in 
satisfaction unexplained , each is statistically s 工 gn工 ficant in aggregate 
and yields many sign工 f 立 cant coefficients. 
Despi te the differences in the sample , the two waves reveal very 
similar estimates. In each case the age measures reveal the U -Shape 
identified by Clark , Oswald and Warr (1996). The youngest and oldest 
workers are often seen as having lower expectations about their jobs and 
so higher satisfaction . Alternati vely , older workers may have 
successfully moved into better matches (Kalleberg and Loscocco 工 983) ， or 
the statistics for older worke工s may suffer from upward bias as the more 
satisfied will more likely continue working (Clark , Oswald and Warr 1996) . 
Mimicking Clark 工 995) each wave reveals that women and those in 
small firms , especi a.lly the very smallest , report greater job 
15 
satisfaction. The firm size result fits with the recurring conjecture 
that the otherwise lower earnings in small firms are warranted because of 
their improved working conditions 
工 6(工 dson 1990). Matching both ear工ier
results and intuition , those with good health , those who are married and 
those who earn more report greater satisfaction although the earnings 
measure is only significant in the first wave. Also confirming earlier 
results (see Clark and Oswald , 1996) but not intu工 t 工on ， the more educated 
are less satisfied. 
Several of the occupation and location controls play a role and those 
who work longer hours repor t: less job satisfaction as might be expected. 
The index of socio-economic status takes the expected positive and 
significant correlation though only in the fourth wave. Similarly , the 
presence of an employer-proγided pension takes a positive coefficient but 
this is significant onl y in the fourth wave. 
工 4
Finally , the two variables of most interest present consistent 
resu1ts across the two waves. Union members report significantly lower 
overall job satisfaction and public sector employees report significantly 
greater job satisfaction. 工ndeed ， despite the modest differences in 
specification , our coefficient on union membership and its standard error 
are virtua11y the same as that presented by C1ark (1996). 
To understand the magnitude of these results we express them in terms 
of the earn工ngs necessary to compensate the re1evant workers. Thus , we 
see that holding all else constant (including earnings) I union members 
have a negative coefficient of approximate1y . 工 1 in the first wave. This 
negative effect can be offset by an increase in 10g earn工ngs equa1 to 1.28 
辱 、
司，
given the positive coefficient .086 on earnings. Thus the e1asticity of 
earnings with respect to unionization is about .40 , indicating that a ten 
percent increase in the probability of being unionized must be compensated 
by a 4 percent inc玄ease in weekly earnings to keep overall job 
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satisfaction constant . Simi1ar1y , a decrease in 10g earnings equa1 t。
工 .9 工 is necessary to e1iminate the positive influence of public employment 
on job satisfaction . Here , the elasticity of earnings with respect to 
public employment is -.59 indicating that a 10 percent increase in the 
chance of public emp10yment can be offset by a nearly 6 percent d:crease 
in weekly earnings keeping overall job satisfaction constant. Both 
and public sector j obs generate strong effects on job satisfaction when 
this is measured in terms of compensating wage differentials. 
v. The Difference Resu 1ts 
The difficu lty with the results presented in the sectio n above is 
that they do not con tro l for i ndi vidual-specific effects. Such 
endogeneity may well genera t e s p urious resu lts i n the cross - sectional 
15 
estimates if those workers toward the lower end of job satisfaction 
distribution sort into unions and those toward the higher end of the 
distribution sort into the pub工 ic sector. As made clear earlier , we hope 
to examine this issue by following job changers across the four waves. 
Table four presents the frequencies for selected dummy variables that 
are i ncluded in the change equation. The values obviously range from -1 , 
moving out of the status , to 1 , moving into the status with 0 representing 
no change in status. Thus , there were nearly twice as many job changers 
who left unionized work , 123 , as who moved into unionized work , 71. Those 
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moving into and out of public sector employment were nearly equal. 
工ncluding these variables directly into the change equation assumes 
symmetry between the influence of exit and entrance on job satisfaction. 
Whatever influence moving into unionized work has on job satisfaction , the 
inf工uence of moving out of unionized work must be equal but opposite. 
This specification is the most straightforward implementation of the 
difference equation as described earlier and allows easy comparisons with 
the cross-sectional estimates. 
Some variables from the cross-section do not have change equivalents 
as they are either constant across individuals or simply do not change. 
Thus , every respondent has aged one year between j ob change.-; and , 
presumably , the gender of all respondents remains constant . Yet , 
the importance of these variables in the cross-section estimates , they are 
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entered as levels in the change equation.-- Other v ariables needed to be 
modified slightly to take reasonable meaning in the c h ange equation. 
Thus , the pension variable indicates whether or not the ne w job provides a 
first employer-prov ided pension. As many pensions can be retained after 
leaving a prev ious employer , the alternativ e case of leaving an 
工 6
employer-provided pension cannot be considered symmetrical. Similarly , we 
presume that educational qualìfications can be gained but not lost. 
工 n addition to the varìables already discussed , dummy variables are 
ìncluded which indicate the year that a job change took place. Thus , Tl 
indìcates that the job change took place between the second and third wave 
and T2 indicates that the j ob change took place between the third and 
fourth wave . The base represents job changeè between the first and second 
wave. 工ncluding these dummies holds cons tant any time specific effects on 
changes in job satisfaction among the job changers. 
Note that because of the relati vely thin tails of the dependent 
variable , as shown in t .he third panel of Table 工， we aggregated the first 
three categories and also the last three categories. This still leaves 
nine discrete levels of change ìn satìsfaction. We are reasonably sure 
that thìs has not generated any of the results we present. First , it 
involves relatively few workers. Second , when we aggregated categories -6 
and - 5 , -4 and - 3 I 6 and 5 , and 4 and 3 yielding 9 slightly different 
categories and all the significant results were confirmed. Third , every 
significant coefficient found with the ordered probit is replicated using 
all thirteen categories in an ordinary least squares estimatìon. As a 
consequence , we vìew the collapsing of a few categor工 es a statistical 
necessity that does not particularly influence the results or their 
工nterpretat~on.
Table 5 presents the ordered probit results on the change in 
satisfaction estimated ac ross all job changers. Many of the relationships 
that we re strong in the cross-sectional estimates a玄e no 'c ev 工 dent in the 
difference equation . For e xample , changes in heal th status or marital 
status are not associated wì th c hanges in job satisfaction. Thus , to draw 
out the point , those that are married tend to report higher job 
工 7
satisfaction but there is no evidence that marital status actual1y plays a 
role. 工nstead it appears that those who tend to be at the higher end of 
the job satisfaction distribution in any event also tend to be married. 
This is precisely the type of individual-specific effect we aim to avoid. 
Similar insignificant coefficients emerge for the measures of education 
and for the regional and occupational controls. Only movements in and out 
of professional and managerial jobs seem to be associated with changes in 
job satisfaction. 
The level values used as controls present an inte玄esting pattern. 
Although men show much lower job satisfaction than women in the 
cross-section , there seems to be no gende玄 difference in the influence of 
- ., 
" 
job changes on the change in job satisfaction. In addition , those who 
report they changed jobs in order to find a better job report no different 
a change in job satisfaction. The age variables do , however , appear t。
play a r。工e. Again , we found a convex pattern but in the change equation 
the signs reverse. Thus , age brings larger increases in job satisfaction 
associated with job changes , but at a diminishing rate. This finding 
provides evidence for the conjecture that as workers age they make better 
matches and that this is the source of the greater reported job 
satisfaction for older workers (Kalleberg and Loscocco 1983) . 
Several of the variables generate results in the difference equation 
that would be anticipated from the cross-section. Workers who move int。
(out of) small firms report a significant increase (decrease) in overall 
job satisfact i on . 工mproved job satisfaction upon moving into smaller 
firms supports the contention that small workplaces prov ide superior 
working conditions. Thus , the cross-sectional result is not generated b y 
20 
unmeasured differences across workers. 
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The role of the pension variable , not examined in earlier 
cross~section work using the BHPS , is st'rong1y confirmed. Those workers 
who receive an emp10yer provided pension for the first time report 
increased job satisfaction. This follows the other economic variables 
which a1so tend to play their anticipated ro1e. Workers who recei ve 
higher (lower) pay in their new job report an increase (decrease) in job 
satisfaction. Those who must work 10nger (shorter) hours report an 
decrease (increase) in job satisfaction holding all else , inc1uding pay , 
constant. 
Finally , the two variables we have been watching most closely emerge 
with statistically significant coefficients. Those who change from 
nonunion to unionized work report a decrease in job satisfaction reflected 
in the symmetrical increase in job satisfaction for those who change from 
unionized to nonunionized work. Those who enter (leave) public sector 
employment report increased (decreased) overall job satisfaction. These 
are the resu1ts that would be anticipated by the cross-sectional estimates 
and they suggest that endogeneity may not be a critica1 problem. Instead 
。f unions attracting those who are dissatisfied , there appears to be a 
genuine decrease in satisfac 七 ion associated with the job overall. 
Similarly , there appears to be a genuine increase in satisfaction 
associated with the job overall in the public sector. 
The magnitudes of the inf1uences are difficu1t to deduce direct1y 
from the ordered probit estimation. One method of capturing the 
magnitudes is to again exarnine the 玄e1ative size of the coefficient on 
change in status compared to that on change in pay. This i8 the 
difference equation analog to the exercise we performed on the 
21 
cross-section. -- We find that the satisfaction 10st by moving to a 
unionized job can be offset b y an increase in 10g earnings of .7 工 This
19 
figure generates an elasticity of earnings with respect to unionization of 
.22. Simi1ar1y , the gain in satisfaction associated with moving int。
pub1ic emp10yment can be offset by a decrease in 10g earnings of 1.14 , 
yie1ding an e1asticity of earnings with respect to pub1ic emp10yment of 
minus .35. These e1asticities ref1ect the same pattern as the 
cross-section with the inf1uence of pub1ic emp10yment being 1arger than 
that of unionization , but both estimates are sma11er than those from the 
cross-section. 
An alternati ve method of capturing the magnitudes is to compute 
direct1y the predicted probabilities of reporting various changes in 
satisfaction. Thus , all variables other than the two of interest are kept 
at their mean level and the cut points are used to predict the probability 
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of observing each of the discrete va1ues for the change in satisfaction. 
The estimated probabilities for each category of change in satisfaction is 
presented in Table 6 for all possible values of the two variables of 
23 interest.-- Aga 工n ， the magnitudes appear substantial. 工 f a worker has not 
changed union or public sector status , the probability of reporting a 
decline in job satisfaction with a job change is .262 (the sum of the 
first four columns associated with the row indicating both change 
variables taking the value of zero) .工f the worker's public sector status 
remains the same , but the worker moves out of a union job the probai 
of reporting a decline in satisfaction is .209. 工 f the worker's union 
status remains the sarne but the worker rnoves into a public sector job , the 
probability of reporting a decline is .180. Finally , if the worker 
changes each status by rnoving out of a union job and into the pub工 ic
sector , the probability of a decline is only .138 , half of that for the 
worker who had no change in status. A variety of other comparisons can be 
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perforrned using the estirnates in Table 6 but they all indicate the large 
influences of the union and public sector variables. 
We began with three hypotheses about the negative association between 
job satisfaction and unionization. The hypothesis that the result is 
generated largely by individual-specific effects , reverse causation , has 
not been supported , at least for overall job satisfaction. The rernaining 
hypotheses are that i t ma.y be union voice (that is , the culture of 
complaint) , or the nature of union jobs. We tend to favor the latter. 
Admi t tedly i we cannot fully disentangle the relati ve role of voice 
and of poorer working conditions. However , it should be noted that the 
difference equations were based on interviews one yea玄 apart suggesting 
the respondent had their new job only sorne six months on average which 
seerns too a short period of time to becorne absorbed 工nto a 11 clirnate of 
complaint". Indeed , it appears typically to take several years for union 
rnembers to come to identify closely with the union and participate fully 
within it (Gaille 1996 , 164) . Further , it does not appear that wo玄kers
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typically join unions in order to participate in a climate of complaint. 
Hence , we think it unlikely tha七 the job changers to unionized work in our 
sarnple would so quickly engage in voice behavior or that the changers to 
nonunion work would 80 quick工y abandon i t . This line of reasoning 
supports the rernaining hypothesis , namely that union job conditions 
overall are worse. 
V工. Further Facets of Job Satisfaction 
The magnitudes indicated in the previous section beg the question of 
exactly what aspects of union and public sector jobs generate the changes 
in overall job satisfactioD. By using sorne of the alternati v e measures of 
job satisfaction , the BHPS prov ides at least a pa主tial answe玄 We
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replicated both our cross-section estimates for the first and fourth wave 
and our differences equation using identical specifications but replacing 
the dependent variable. Using the same seven point scale , the questions 
that serve as the basis for the new dependent variables ask workers about 
2S 
their satisfaction with specific facets of the job. 
Table 7 summarizes our results for three of these facets as well as 
for the overall measure already discussed. Considering union members 
first , we find that consistent with the results for overall job 
satisfaction , union members indicate less satisfaction with "the work 
itself" in both cross-sections. Union members also report lower 
satisfaction with pay in both cross-sections. However , the diffe玄ence
equation does not reveal such results in either case. The implication is 
that individual effects for unionized workers are generating the 
cross-sectional dissatisfaction with both of these job facets. Thus , 
union workers are dissatisfied about their pay relative to nonunion 
workers until they actually move sectors. After a job change , and holding 
any change in pay constant , union members who move to nonunion jobs do not 
feel any more satisfied with their pay. 工n other words , the association 
between dissatisfaction with pay and unionization appears to be generated 
by the tendency of those toward the lower end of the satisfaction with pay 
distribution to be sorted into union jobs. 
The same holds true for satisfaction wi th the work i tself . Union 
members report lower satisfaction with the work but when they move to a 
nonunion j ob I they do not change their e v aluation , they remain 
dissatisfied . Again , for this face仁 the cross-section results appear to 
be generated by sorting. Where then does the result for the difference 
equation on overall job satisfaction originate? 
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The only facetto completely parallel the overall job satisfaction 
equations is that for satisfaction with the "relations with the boss." 
Workers in union jobs report lower satisfaction in both cross-sections and 
the difference equation result implies that new workers in union jobs 
report a decline in satisfaction with the boss and new workers to nonunion 
jobs report an increase in satisfaction with the boss. This result 
reflects to some extent that found by Sloane and Bender (1996). As noted 
above , they found with SCEL工 data that once conditioned on the quality of 
employment relations , the relative dissatisfaction of union members 
vanished. Our results can be similarly interpreted as showing that a 
major reason for the overall dissatisfaction with union jobs is 
real dissatisfaction with employment relations. 
We find a somewhat more consistent picture of the role of public 
sector employment. Following the results on job satisfaction overa工工，
public sector workers indicate greater satisfaction with "the work itself 'l 
and with relations with the boss in both cross-sections. Each of these 
results carries over to the difference equation. Thus , when pri vate 
sector workers move to the public sector they report an increase in 
。verall job satisfaction , an increase in satisfaction with the work itself 
and an increase in satisfaction with the relations with the boss. These 
results imply that these three facets are genuinely better in the F- \ 月
sector. However , while the results from the two cross-sections ind土 ca已」
no difference in satisfaction with pay associated with public employment , 
the difference equation indicates that workers who move into public sector 
jobs report a decline in satisfaction with pay (perhaps consistent with 
the increase in satisfaction with the work itself). This last result does 
provide support for the contention that those higher in the distribution 
of satisfaction with pay tend to be sorted into the public sector . 
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Ultimately , our evidence provides a new understanding of the role of 
tastes in sorting workers into unions and public sector employment. The 
strong expression by unionized workers of overall job dissatisfaction 
falls by half after controlling for individual effects (elasticity of .40 
in the cross -section and .22 in the difference equation). This drop is 
reflected in the apparent dissatisfaction expressed about pay and the work 
itself vanishing completely in the difference equations. Union wo玄kers
complain more but they would complain more about these facets in either 
sector. Despite this finding , sorting does not provide a complete 
explanation. The satisfaction of union workers with their job overall and 
with their boss increases when they take nonunion jobs. Thus , even given 
the importance of sorting , there appears to be something about union jobs 
that generates dissatisfaction. 
As for public sector wo玄kers ， the pattern is simpler. The appearance 
。f greater satisfaction is confirmed by the difference equations for the 
job overall , for the work itself and for relations with the boss. Yet , 
even for public sector workers there is evidence of sorting. Public 
sector jobs are associated with lower satisfaction with pay in the 
difference equation , (but not in the cross-section) , implying that public 
sector jobs attract those who put a lower priority on pay. 
VII. Conclusions 
The basic point is that difference equations exploit the panel nature 
of the BHPS and allow a closer examination of the role of worker sorting 
in determining patterns of job satisfaction across sectors. 工n this paper 
we have concentrated on the distinction between union and nonunion 
sectors , largely because previous research has indicated substantial 
dissatisfaction within the union sector . To prov ide a contrast , we have 
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also analyzed the public-private distinction. By controlling for 
individual effects , the difference equations provide a suitable mechanism 
for testing the reserve causation , or sorting , hypothesis . 
Our results do tend to suggest that union jobs - taken "overall" 
are 刊 worse" and that government jobs are "better". Both the cross-section 
estimates and the d .i fference equation estimate indicate that union jobs 
are associated with reduced overall job satisfaction and public sector 
jobs are associated with increased overall job satisfaction . 
工ndividual-specific effects do not generate these basic results. 
Nevertheless , when probing into particular facets of job satisfaction 
we find individual-specific effects to be important. 工n particular , much 
6 
of union workers' lower satisfaction with the work itself , and with pay , 
is due to an individual-specific effect: union workers complain more , but 
they would complain more about these aspects in ei ther sector. (By 
contrast , un工。n wo玄kers ' dissatisfaction with relations with the boss is 
genuine. ) Similarly , much of the public sector workers' evaluation of 
their pay flows from individual-specific effects: the public sector worker 
seems to care less about pay. Perhaps , there is a "public service ethic ll 
after all . 
A va玄iety of refinements remain for the future. As the panel length 
grows , the number of job changes will increase. This could allow separate 
esrl而且tës fδY ffièfi àfid WOmen and for ~hose originally in a par~icular union 
or public sector status . 工ncreased sample size might also allow 
estimation using those who are more nearly exogenous job changers such as 
those who lost jobs because of plant c losings. 工 t might also be suggested 
that job changing and job satisfaction are related and that a 
comprehensive estimation shou工d account for such simultane ity . 
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Table 1 
The Distribution of the Job Satisfaction Variable 
1st Wave (N=478 工)
工
工 62
2 
84 
3 
215 
4 
613 
5 6 
1295 
7 
1486 926 
' -HT
. 
4th Wave (N=4238) 
1 
87 
2 3 4 
337 戶。
戶bFHJ
no 
6 7 
工40 320 1791 707 
Difference (N=1000) 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 。 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3 11 18 41 56 136 282 205 113 72 35 21 7 
L 一一一一一一一一一一一一一 J LJ L 一一一一一一一一一一一一一」
26.5 主 28.2 告 45.3 毛
The va工ues for the first and fourth wave are reported satisfaction with 
the job overall. The final panel measures the difference in 玄eported
overall satisfaction between adjacent periods associated with job 
changes across all four waves. 
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Table 2 
工ndependent Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
4th WAVE CROSS-SECTION (mean , s.d.) 
Age: Age of the respondent on the interview date (37 . 0 , 11.9) 
Age2: Age squared divided by 1000 (1.51 , 0.94) 
Educationl: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent' s highest 
qualification is nursing , A-levels , O-levels or equivalent (0.40 , 0.49) 
Education2: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent' s highest 
qualification is a degree , teaching qualification or higher (0.34 , 0.48) 
工ndex: The value of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale for the socio-economic 
status of the current job--status increases with the index (46.4 , 16.1) 
Health: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent's health status is 
good or excellent (0.80 , 0.40) 
誼。urs: The natural 10g of the number of hours of work expected in a 
normal week (3.43 , 0.50) 
Male : Dummy variable equal one if respondent is ma1e (0.49 , 0.50) 
Married .,: . Dummy variable equal one if respondent is rnarr工ed (0.26 , 0.44) 
pay: The natural 10g of the usual month1y rnonth1y gross pay (5 . 27 , 0.85) 
pension: Durnmy variable equa1 to one if the respondent' s ernp10yer 
provides a pension (0 . 48 , 0.49) 
Public: Dummy variable equa1 one if the respondent works in the public 
sector (0.3 工， 0.46) 
sizel: Dummy variab1e equal one if the respondent's firmhas a size of 
less than 100 workers (0.33 , 0.47) 
Size2: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent's firm has a size of 
between 100 and 199 workers (0.36 , 0.48) 
Union: Dummy variable equa1 one i f the respondent' s work place has a 
union and the respondent is a rnernber (0.31 , 0.46) 
North: Durnmy variable equal one if the respondent works in Northern 
Eng1and (0.26 , 0.44) 
South: Dummy va玄iab l e equal one i f the respondent works in Southern 
England (0.39 , 0.48) 
Scot: Durnmy v a riable equal one if the respondent works in Scot_ ; 
(0.09 , 0.29) 
Wales: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent works in Wales (0 . 05 , 
0.20) 
Midlnds: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent works in the 
Mid工ands of England (0.2 工 ， 0.40) 
Prof/Mang: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent works as a 
professional or manager (0 . 2 工 ， 0.41) 
Manual: Dummy var i able equal one if the respondent is a manual worker 
(0.25 , 0.44) 
NonManual: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent is a nonmanual 
worker (0.35 I 0.48) 
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Table 2 Continued 
Foreman: Dummy variable equal .one if the respondent is a foreman (0.10 , 
0.30) 
Service: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent is a service worker 
(0.09 , 0.28) 
D工FFERENCE EQUAT工ON (mean , s .d.) 
.6Health: Postchange value of the health status dummy minus 
the prechange value (0.01 , 0.45) 
.6Index: Postchange value of 工ndex minus prechange value (-0.75 , 13.1) 
.6Married: Postchange value of the marital status dummy minus the 
prechange value (0.02 , 0.21) 
ðSize: Postchange value of Size工 minus the prechange value (0.02 , 0.52) 
.6Hours: Postchange value of Hours minus the prechange value (0.0 工， 0.48) 
.6pay: Post-change value of pay rninus the pre-change value (0.06 , 0.61) 
.6Union: Postchange value of Union rninus the prèchange value (-0.05 , 
0.44) 
.6Public: Postchange value of public minus prechange va工ue (- 0 . 01 , O. 36 ) 
NewPension: Dumrny variable equal one if the worker changes to a job 
that for the first time offers a pension (0.13 , 0.34) 
NewEducl : Durnmy var工able equal one if the respondent reports a new 
highest level of Education1 (0.0 工， 0.1 工)
NewEduc2: Durnrny variable equal to if the respondent reports a _ new 
highest level of Education2 (0.04 , 0.18) 
JobBetter: Dummy variable equal one if the respondent reports 
changing jobs in order to find a better job (0.49 , 0.50) 
Age: Age of respondent in the interview prior to job change (33.5 ，工0 平 2)
AGE2: Age of respondent squared tirnes 1000 (1.23 , 0.75) 
Male: Durnmy variab工e equal to one if respondent is rnale (0.45 , 0.50) 
.6 South: Postchange value of South rninus prechange value (0.0 工， 0.14) 
.6North: Postchange value of North minus prechange value (0.00 , 0.09) 
.6Scot: Postchange value of Scot rninus prechange value (0.00 , 0.09) 
.6Wales: Postchange value of wales minus prechange value (0.00 , 0.05) 
ðMid工nds:Postchange valuè of Midlnds minus prechange value (-0.0 工， 0.10) 
.6Prof/Mang: Postchange value of Prof/Mang rninus prechange value (-.01 , 
0.39) 
ðManual: Postchange value of Manual rninus prechange value (.035~ 0.39) 
.6Nonmanual: P9stchange value of Nonrnanual rninus prechange value (0.00 , 
0.50 ) 
ðForeman: Postchange value of Foreman minus prechange value -( - 0 .03 , 
0.34) 
ðService: Postchange value of Service minus prechange value (0.01 , 0 . 40) 
28 
Table 3 
Cross-Section Estimates 
Dependent variable: Level of overall job satifaction 
constant 
age 
age2 
EducationJ. 
Education2 
工ndex
Health 
Hours 
Male 
v 
-
Married 
Pay 
Pension 
S 工 zel
S 工 ze2
North 
South 
Scot 
Wales 
Prof/Mang 
1st Wave 
3.136* 
(15.82) 
-.046工背
(5.209) 
.6575* 
(6.862) 
-.3208* 
(6.564) 
-.2110* 
(5.377) 
-.0009 
(0.548) 
.2490* 
(6.480) 
-.2182* 
(4.163) 
-.2615* 
(6.862) 
.0943* 
(2.496) 
.0856* 
(2.075ì 
.0011 
(0.027) 
.2032* 
(4.732) 
.0625 
(1.586) 
-.0030 
(0.067) 
-.0606 
( 工 . 396)
- . 120 工 t
(2.048) 
.0694 
(0.881) 
.0666 
( 0 . 750) 
29 
4th ~'lave 
3.782* 
(16 . 96) 
-.0464* 
(4 . 817) 
.6498* 
(6.009) 
-.4025* 
(8.128) 
-.2747* 
(6.285) 
.0045* 
(2.469) 
.1981 世
(5.084) 
-.2591* 
(4.812} 
-.2285* 
(6.009} 
.0858 世
(2.230) 
.0283 
(0.717) 
.2267* 
(4.141) 
.2075* 
(4.650) 
.08 工 6*
(1.984 ) 
-.048 工
(工 .009)
-.1127* 
(2.509 ) 
-.1461* 
(2.243 ) 
- . 003 工
(0.037 ) 
.0635 
(0.688 ) 
Table 3 Continued 
Manual -.1281** 
(1.876) 
Nonmanual -.0603 
(0.879) 
Foreman .0066 
(0.080) 
Public .1647 會
(4.167) 
Union -.1096* 
(2.710) 
Mu1 .2013* 
(9.375) 
Mu2 !; .5432* 
(18.12) 
Mu3 1.110* 
(32.07) 
Mu4 1.681* 
(45.87) 
Mu5 2.4 工 8*
(62.52) 
Loglikelihood -7761.8 
(restricted) 
Loglikelihood -7563.3 
(unrestricted) 
N 478 工
Note that t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*statistically significant in a 5 percent test 
背 *statistically significant in a 10 percent test 
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-.1944* 
(2.817) 
-.2111* 
(3.012) 
-.1772* 
(2 . 059) 
.1080* 
(2.610) 
-.1490 會
(3.587) 
.4507 世
(12.16) 
.9537* 
(21.84) 
1 . 288* 
(28.42) 
1.901* 
(40.36) 
3.160* 
(62.11) 
-6673.4 
-6475.1 
4238 
Table 4 
Frequencies of Selected Variables 
-1 O 1 
手司
!::.Union 工 23 806 71 
!::, Public 67 872 61 
!::.Size 146 725 129 
!::.Health 97 799 104 
!::.Married 14 956 30 
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Table 5 
The Difference Equation 
Dependent variable: Change in overall job satisfaction 
constant .9740* 
(2.349) 
.6.Married .0970 
(0.596) 
.6. 8 工 ze .1382* 
(2.173) 
.6.Health .0967 
(1.278) 
.6.Hours -.3057* 
(3.276) 
.6. pay .24 工 9*
(3.079) 
A工ndex -.0020 
(0.579) 
NewPension .2042* 
(2.074) 
NewEduc1 -.2126 
(0.680) 
NewEduc2 -.2666 
(1.380) 
.6. 8outh .2608 
(0.945) 
.6.North -.1202 
(0.300) 
.6.8cot .2921 
(0.507) 
.6.Wales .3899 
(0.173) 
.6.Prof/Mang .2893** 
(1.836) 
6Manual 
-.0373 
(0.280) 
6Nonmanual .0361 
(0.281) 
6Service .0417 
(0.26 工)
Age 
.0455* 
(工 .988)
Age2 
-.5750** 
(1.870) 
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Table 5 Continued 
Male 
.0608 
(0.892) 
.0428 
(0.601) 
JobBetter 
T工
. 1460** 
(1.813) 
-.0105 
(0.129) 
T2 
ðUnion 
-.1714* 
(2 .工 69)
ðPublic .2755 會
(3.122) 
Mu1 .4102* 
(6.485) 
Mu2 .7431* 
(9.902) 
Mu3 1.261* 
(15.30) 
Mu4 2.029* 
(23.25) 
Mu5 2.609* 
(28.7 工)
Mu6 3.046* 
(31.76) 
Mu7 
d o o hd﹒工
e
句l-
←』
ec ‘K-1 .lr ?LH
←」
gs oe LR 
3.492* 
(33.31) 
-1965.7 
d o  oe ht .-c 可4.le
玄
，κ
←』
-ls - e gr 。
n
LU 
-1934.8 
N 1000 
Note that t-statistics are in parentheses . 
*statistically significant in a 5 percent test 
**statistically significant in a 10 percent test 
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Table 6 
Predicted Change in Job Satisfacion 
s-4 -3 -2 -1 O 工 2 3 這 4
òUnion , 'i. ' òPublic 
-1 工 .008 .018 .028 .084 .237 .228 .156 .工工 5 .128 
。 工 .0 工 5 .024 .037 .104 .262 .226 .141 .090 .095 
-1 O .020 .029 .043 .117 .275 .221 .131 .086 .078 
O O .029 . 039 .055 .139 .29 工 . 209 .114 .070 .055 
工， O .042 .052 .068 .158 .299 .193 .096 . 054 .039 
o 工 .052 .060 .076 . 169 .300 .181 .086 .046 .031 
工 -1 .072 .074 .089 .185 .295 .159 .069 .035 .021 
Each cel工 represents the percentage of the sample expected to fall 
within the relevant change in satisfaction category evaluating the 
ordered probit at the mean values of all variables other than òUnion and 
òPublic. 
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Table 7 
Other Facets of Job Satisfaction 
Overall Work Itself Pay Relations 
with Boss 
.,ee -
v a w ←』S 司斗
Union 
Public + + O + 
4th Wave 
Union 
Public + + o + 
Difference 
Union 
Public 
O 。
+ + + 
Statistical significance at the five percent level and the direction of 
the partial correlation are indicated by + or - while 0 indicates a 
insignificant coefficient. 
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Endnotes 
1 For a spirited defense of using job satisfaction rneasures to gain such 
insights see Freernan (1978). 
2Hersch ancl 5tone (1990) present evidence frorn a survey in Oregon 
suggesting that the union voice explanation is only partially correct. 
Unions do generate discontent (lower job satisfaction) but this has real 
consequences - for at least this sample - as the discontent resu工 ts in the 
same propensity to quit as it would in nonunion rnembers . 
3Abowd and Farber (1983) found that the characteristics associated with 
searching for a union job tended to be the opposite of the characteristics 
associated with a worker being èhosen frorn the union queue. For exarnple , 
the least educated populate the queue as they tend to have the rnost to 
gain from a union job. Yet , they are the 工east likely to be chosen from 
the queue by a unioni zed employer. As a consequence , reduced form 
probability rnodels conflate these countervailing tendencies. 
40n U.K. public sector pay premiums see Elliot and Duffus (1996). Fringe 
benefits , such as vacation entitlements , are also more generous in the 
U.K. public sector (Elliot and Murphy 1987). This latter evidence fits 
the view expressed by Reder 工 975) that politicians will attempt to win 
the favor of both public employees and voters by showing more restraint on 
highly visible wage settlements than on less visible fringe benefi~s . ? 、
also fits with U. 5 . evidence that job queues can be ev工dent for pUb .L 1C 
sector jobs e v en in those circumstances where there is not a public sector 
earnings advantage (Heywood and Mohanty 1993 and 1995) . 
5Korp i (1997) uses a difference equation to hold constant 
土ndividual-specific effects in his showing that unemployment is associated 
with lower subjective well-being. 
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6 工 t remains possible that there exists a second order of individual fixed 
effects in the change equation. In such a case , the job changes are 
endogenous and the pattern of these second order fixed effects may be 
correlated with the changes in the variables of interest. Gibbons and 
Katz (1992) failed to find such effects in the context of industry rents. 
Their technique of estimating a change equation only for exogenous job 
changers (the victims of plant closings) cannot be implemented in the BHPS 
because of an inadequate sample size. We have no reason to suspect such 
effects but obviously cannot rule them out. 
7The exact wording of the question is "All things considered , how 
satisfiëd or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the 
same 1 - 7 scale." 
8The inclusion of the socio-economic status variable is designed to 
compensate for our reduced number of occupational controls . 
9Restricting the sample in this manner should eliminate the role of the 
interna工 labor rnarket and the tendency for "job paths" to be confused with 
job changes. Job paths within an internal labor market may be the result 
of schemes to delay compensation or hold promotion tournarnentsbut should 
not be considered a job change. 
10 
This increase in satisfaction on average mirrors other estimates of ours 
(available upon request) showing those who change jobs h ave lowe_ 、
satisfaction prio玄 to the change , other things equal , than those who do 
not change jobs . This supports the close relationship between job 
satisfaction and quits as shown b y Akerloff , Rose and Yellen (工 988) . 
40 
11 
The BHPS includes broader measures of "happìness" or well-beìng (Clark 
and Oswald 1994) but the influence of unionization and public employment 
seems more likely to be reflected in the measures of job satisfaction. 
12 
For example , the fourth wave consists of 31 percent union members and an 
equal 31 percent public sector employees. These compare with 34 percent 
union rnem.bers and 32 percent public sector ernployees in the first wave. 
工 3
This has not been a subject of scrutiny in the recent British literature 
on job satisfaction. 
工 4
Like all panel surveys the BHPS suffers from both attrition and possible 
problems with respondent recall (paull , 1997). Fu玄ther ， the sample of 
" ~ . .
respondents for whom all data is complete may be a selected sample not 
fully .representative of all who work. The issue of representativeness may 
be especially critical for respondents with complete data in adjoining 
years as needed by the difference equation. There is no a priori reason 
to suspect that any of the resulting biases would influence the main 
findings on the importance of indi vidual specific effects amongst union 
and public sector workers. 
15 Note , however I that using a similar specification for data from the 
United States men and women emerge with no difference in their overall job 
satisfaction (Donohue and Heywood , 1997 ) . 
工 6Attempts to directly confirm this by entering working conditions directly 
into the earnings equation tend to still reveal lower earnings in smaller 
firms (Schrnidt and Zìmmerman，工 991) . 
f 
4 工
17 工dentifying the natura1 10g of earnings as LnW , the re1evant portion of 
the estimated equation is summarized as Prob (S j) F [α(LnW) + óU]. 
Thus , dProb (S j) 0 imp1ies that αd(LnW) + ódU 0 and (dW/dU) (l/W) 
- (α/ ó). Multiplying both sides of the final equality by the mean value 
of U yields η-(α/ ó)U. The ratio of the coefficients is -1.28 and 
W, U 
the mean value of unionization .31 generating an elasticity of .397. 
工 8A11 occupation and location variables take the same form as those in 
Table 4 but are not shown to save space. The frequencies are available 
from the authors. 
19 The usual interpretation of including level variables is to examine the 
change in coefficients between periods. In each case the level from the 
pre-change wave is included. 
20 Mayo and Murray (1991) , for example , argue small firms attract a lowe玄
quality of worker. 
2 工One way to see this is to recognize that the relative portion of the 
difference equation yields 0α(b.LnW) + ó (b.U) . Treating the changes , 
b.Lnw and b.U, analogously to total derivatives results in η-(α/ ó)U 
W, U 
exactly the equation used earlier. 
22 The predicted probability of being in the first category is the a玄ea
under the standard normal from minus infinity to -X' 白， that for being in 
the second category is the area from -X'ß to Mu(l) - X'ß , that for the 
third category is the area from Mu( 工) - X'ß to Mu(2) - X'ß and so on. The 
final probability is the area from Mu(7) - X'ß to positive infinity. 
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23 Note that we also estimated the difference equation with added 
interactions to separately capture changes into unionized public sector 
jobs and nonunionized private sector jobs. The coefficients on these 
variables were insignificant suggesting the current additive specification 
is sensible. 
24 For exarnple , when asked in the SCEL工 survey why they initially joined a 
union , the largest share indicated they did so only as a condition of 
ernployrnent and in particular only a scant 7 percent had the airn of gaining 
rnore influence over working conditions (Gaille 1996 , 144). 
25 Each question 
. 
. 
asks "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the 
following aspect of your own present j ob. 11 The aspects include those 
identified in Table 7. 
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